This idea of this twofold aspect of beauty–that it is simultaneously objective and subjective–is not something new, but is found both in Thomas and Aristotle.
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics opens with the claim that the good is that which all men seem to aim at. He goes on to clarify that it is only the virtuous man whose aim is true. But the point of his opening is to draw attention to a significant point of anthropology, that what all men desire, that is what the will aims at is some perceived good. It is not a matter of teaching the will to desire good things, but of becoming men and women who will or desire that which not only seems good, but is so in truth.
Aquinas makes a similar movement in supplying two definitions of beauty. Compare these two excerpts from the Summa Theologica:
Thomas:
Summa I-II, 27.1: is good the only cause of love
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression “beautiful,” for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that “good” means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the “beautiful” is something pleasant to apprehend.
vs.
Summa I. 39, 8:persons in relation to essence whether attributes appropriately attributed to persons in fitting manner
or beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” or “perfection,” since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.
all men purus good
absolutely or simply vs. in some manner and as the apprehend it.
Summa I-II, 27.1: is good the only cause of love?
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression “beautiful,” for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that “good” means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the “beautiful” is something pleasant to apprehend.
Summa I. 39, 8: Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Beauty includes three conditions, “integrity” or “perfection,” since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due “proportion” or “harmony”; and lastly, “brightness” or “clarity,” whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.
Beauty is indeed objective, just as truth, just as unity, just as being. But God made us persons and desires us to know such things (and himself) as persons. Is not this fact beautiful, that beauty contains in it a reference both to a subject and object, as does truth? For this reason, the subjectivity of beauty must never be forgotten, lest we fail to love beauty in truth or truth in beauty.
Beauty is perceived, and only perceived, subjectively. Christ confirms this in what he says about the singleness or wholeness of the eye. Only a healthy eye will see well. The perception of beauty (or goodness, or truth, particularly certain truths) depends upon the condition, here the health, of the subject.
It is nothing new to say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. It is something else to say that it is there and there alone. And this I do not say. But what must be graped is that beauty is revived not only according to its own objectivity, but also according to the condition of the individual.
In making this claim, we are spanning a tradition from Plato to Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel.
We see beauty better, not when we know certain impersonal rules, but when we love. At best, rules are pedagogues or tutors unto love. This is why God became man–so that our rule, our ultimate guide might be a living person and measure.
Just as in Lewis’s Experiment in Criticism, it behooves us to ask not just what we are reading, but what kind of readers we are, or are becoming.
